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So, in the recent case of Gallagherv. Gallagher,5 set forth above,
the court has continued the policy inaugurated in Hays v. Harris8
in giving the statute a broad construction, and construed
"benevolent purpose" to cover scholarships in a college. The
wording of the statute is certainly liberal, for "benevolent" has
been defined to mean "all gifts prompted by good will or kindly
feeling toward the recipient, whether an object of charity or not.
It is a word of somewhat broader, larger, and wider meaning than
charitable."'1 7 That the statute will be construed in keeping with
its liberal wording, is indicated by Gallagher v. Gallagher.'s
As the cases now stand, a devise or bequest in trust for religious
purposes is void, because the court in its earlier decisions construed
the word "conveyance" not to include a devise or bequest. But
in construing the same word in a statute relating to charitable
trusts of a non-religious nature, 9 the court in more recent decisions has arrived at an opposite result, and decided that both
devisee and bequest are included in the world "conveyance."
Quaere, if the question now came before the court as to the
validity of a devise or bequest in trust for religious purposes,
would the court adhere to its earlier decisions and declare the
trust void; or would it decide in accordance with its present
liberal views with regard to trusts of a non-religious nature?

-W.

T. 0'FARRL.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PRINCiPAL's LIABILITY FOR THE FRAUDUILENT ACT OF His AGENT-ACT SOLELY FOR TE

AGENT'S BENEFIT.

-McDonnell was an agent of the defendant railway. His duty
was, and his continuous practice had been, to give notice to consignees, including the plaintiff, of the arrival of goods. The agent,
in pursuance of a scheme of his own, notified the plaintiff of the
arrival of goods under a bill of lading and the plaintiff relying
on this notice, paid a draft. The agent had forged the bill of
lading. The plaintiff sued the railway in deceit. The Circuit
Court of Appeals followed Friedlanderv. Texas and Pacifi Rail15.Supra, n. 1.
18 Supra, n. 12.
17

7 C. J. 1141.

18 Supra, n. 1.
19 CODE, c 57, §3.
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road Compcny,1 gave judgment for the defendant, and were of
the opinion that the Bills of Lading Act 2 was a Congressional approval of the rule in that case.3 The United States Supreme Court
overruled the Friedlander Case and held that the agent was acting
in the scope of his authority, and though lie was acting fraudulently and for himself, the principal was liable. The Supreme
Court said that the Act has no application to the present case."
Upon the question presented, namely whether a carrier is bound
by the act of its agent in issuing a fraudulent bill of lading, there
is a square conflict of authority. The rule laid down by a minority
of the courts, known as the New York rule, is that where the authority of an agent depends upon some extrinsic fact which from
its nature rests particularly within his knowledge the principal
is bound by the representation of the agent as to the existence of
such fact.' In Illinois and Nebraska liability has been imposed on
the ground of estoppel. 6 The majority rule as laid down by the
English, Canadian, and Federal courts of the United States, and
by most of the state courts, is that the agent of the carrier, having
goods, cannot bind the carrier even -as to an innocent transfereL
for value of the bill of lading. 7 The principal's nonliability has
been placed on the ground that a false statement in the instrumenit
signed by the agent does not of itself operate as an estoppel against
the principal." The minority rule is more consistent than the
majority rule with the doctrine that vicarious liability of a principal extends to all tortious conduct which is incident to the class
1 130 El. S. 416, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570, 32 L. ed. 991 (1889).

39 Stat. 542 (49 U. S. C. A. 102).
lading has been issued

*

22 is as follows:

by an agent * *

*

authority includes the issuance of bills of lading

"If a bill of

whose actual or apparent
* *

*

the carrier shall be

liable * * * for damages caused by the non-receipt of goods."
3 Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Gleason, 21 F. (2d) 883 (1927).

4 Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 161 (1929).
5 Harold v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 93 Kan." 456, 144 Pac. 823 (1914);
Batavia Bank v. New York, etc., R. Co., 106 N. Y. 195, 12 N. E. 433, 60 Am.
Rep. 440 (1887); Sanford v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 79 S. 0. 519, 01 S.
E. 74 (1908).
6 St. Louis & I. M. R. Co. v. Larned, 103 Ill. 293 (1882); Sioux City &
P. R. Co. -. First Nat. Bank, 10 Neb. 556, 7 N. W. 311, 35 Am. Rep. 488
(1880).
7 Friedlander 'v. Texas, etc., R. Co., supra, n. 1; Dun v. City Nat. Bank
(C. C. A.) 58 F. 174 (1893); Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Nat]. Park Bank,
188 Ala. 109, 65 So. 1003 (1914); Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Wilkins, 44
Md. 11, 22 Am. Rep. 26 (1875); Roy v.Nor. Pac. R. Co., 42 Wash. 572,
575, 85 Pac. 53 (1906); McLean v. Fleming, ,. R. 2 H. C. Sc. 128 (1871);
Cox v. Bruce, 18 Q. B. Div. 147 (1886); Erb v. Gt. West. R. Co, 42 U. C.
Q. B. 90, 3 Ont. App. 446, 5 Can. S. C. 179 (1887).
8 Cox v. Bruce, supra, n. 7; Second Nat. Bank v. Walbridge, 18 Oh. St.
419 (1849).
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of acts which the tort-feasor is engaged to perform. It is worthy of
note that the early English cases which established the majority
rule, and which the American courts have followed, were decided
before the doctrine extending a principal's liability was fully developed,9 also that the majority rule, even where it is followed,
has not always met with the approval of the courts.10 This leads
one to believe that had the doctrine extending the principal's
liability been established at the time of the early cases the courts
would have taken a different course. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court in overruling the Friedlander Case adopted the
sounder rule. A bill of lading is negotiable in a sense. The railroads, knowing this, entrust an agent to issue such bills. The
limits of the agent's authority are in his own peculiar knowledge,
even to the extent that should the-consignee attempt to investigate
he would in most cases have to inquire of the very agent who
issued the bill of lading. Under such circumstances the carrier
should be held liable.
-R. IE. PENDLE--TON.

THm Powx OF THE COURT TO GRANT A NEW TRiAL ON CONnaCTIG EviDNcE.-The trial court granted a new trial to the

defendant, after a verdict in favor of plaintiff who was suing for
personal injuries sustained while a passenger on defendant's motor
bus. The testimony for the plaintiff was, in effect, that the driver
of the motor bus was driving rapidly in an attempt to pass a car
in front, and while about to pass it, the Bowlby car appeared in
the opposite direction causing the driver to swerve to the right so
abruptly that plaintiff's arm which was in the window sill was projected through, and severed when the two cars came in contact.
The defendant's testimony was a denial of this. Also, the defendant contends that the testimony of the Bowlbys that they did
not see the bus until they were passing the car in front of it is
inconsistent with plaintiff's claim that the bus was on the left side
of the road. The defendant further contends that, as the physical
facts show contact only with the rear of the Bowlby car and the
front of the bus, this raises doubt as to whether the bus swerved
9 Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, L. P. 1867, 2 Exch. 259; Grant v.
Norway, 10 C. B. 665 (1851); Coleman v. Ricks, 16 C. B. 104 (1847).
10 Whitechurch v. Cavanaugh, 1902 A. C. 117; Nat. Bank v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N. W. 342, 9 L. R. A. 263 (1890).
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